$\mathcal{E}$-MACs: Towards More Secure and More Efficient Constructions of Secure Channels

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Abstract—In cryptography, secure channels enable the confidential and authenticated message exchange between authorized users. A generic approach of constructing such channels is by combining an encryption primitive with an authentication primitive (MAC). In this work, we introduce the design of a new cryptographic primitive to be used in the construction of secure channels. Instead of using general purpose MACs, we propose the deployment of special purpose MACs, named $\mathcal{E}$-MACs. The main motivation behind this work is the observation that, since the message must be both encrypted and authenticated, there might be some redundancy in the computations performed by the two primitives. Therefore, removing such redundancy can improve the efficiency of the overall composition. Moreover, computations performed by the encryption algorithm can be further utilized to improve the security of the authentication algorithm. In particular, we will show how $\mathcal{E}$-MACs can be designed to reduce the amount of computation required by standard MACs based on universal hash functions, and show how $\mathcal{E}$-MACs can be secured against key-recovery attacks.

Index Terms—Confidentiality, authenticity, message authentication code (MAC), authenticated encryption, universal hash families

1 Introduction

There are two main approaches for the construction of secure channels in cryptography: a dedicated approach and a generic approach. In the dedicated approach, a cryptographic primitive is designed to achieve authenticated encryption as a standalone system (see, e.g., [2]–[7]). In the generic approach, an authentication primitive is combined with an encryption primitive to provide message integrity and confidentiality (see, e.g., [8]–[12]).

Generic compositions can be constructed in three different ways: Encrypt-and-Authenticate (E&A), Encrypt-then-Authenticate (EtA), or Authenticate-then-Encrypt (AtE). In E&A, the plaintext is passed to the encryption algorithm to get a corresponding ciphertext, the same plaintext is passed to the MAC algorithm to get a corresponding tag, and the resulting ciphertext-tag pair, $\big(\mathcal{E}(M), \mathrm{MAC}(M)\big)$, is transmitted to the intended receiver. In EtA, the plaintext is passed to the encryption algorithm to get a ciphertext, the resulting ciphertext is passed to the MAC algorithm to get a tag, and the resulting $\Big(\mathcal{E}(M), \mathrm{MAC}\big(\mathcal{E}(M)\big)\Big)$ is transmitted to the intended receiver. In AtE, the plaintext is passed to the MAC algorithm to get a tag, the resulting tag is appended to the plaintext message, the plaintext-tag concatenation is passed to the encryption algorithm, and the resulting $\Big(\mathcal{E}\big(M, \mathrm{MAC}(M)\big)\Big)$ is transmitted to the intended receiver. The transport layer of SSH uses a variant of the E&A composition [8], IPSEC uses a variant of the EtA composition [10], while SSL and TLS use variants of the AtE composition [9], [11].

Over dedicated primitives, generic compositions possess several design and analysis advantages due to their modularity and the fact that encryption and authentication schemes can be designed, analyzed, and replaced independently from each other [13]. Further, and most important, generic compositions can lead to faster implementations of authenticated encryption when fast encryption algorithms, such as stream ciphers, are combined with fast MACs, such as universal hash functions based MACs [13].

However, generic compositions are more involved than just combining an encryption algorithm and a MAC algorithm. In [13], [14] the security of different generic compositions of authenticated encryption systems is analyzed. Using a secure encryption algorithm (secure in the sense that it provides privacy against chosen-plaintext attacks) and a secure MAC (secure in the sense that it provides unforgeability against chosen-message attacks), it was shown that only the EtA will guarantee the construction of secure channels [13], [14]. Therefore, special attention must be paid to the design of secure channels if the E&A or the AtE compositions are used.

Although significant efforts have been devoted to the design of dedicated authenticated encryption primitives and the analysis of the generic compositions, little effort has been made to the design of new primitives in order to improve the efficiency and security of generic compositions. In this paper, we introduce the design of special purpose MACs to be used in the construction of E&A and AtE compositions. The main motive behind this work was the intuition that MACs used in the generic construction of authenticated encryption systems, unlike standard MACs, can utilize the fact that messages to be authenticated must also be encrypted. That is, since both the encryption and authentication algorithms are applied to the same message, there might be some redundancy in the computations of the two primitives. If this turned out to be the case, removing such redundancy can improve the efficiency of the overall operation.

The E&A and AtE compositions, however, impose an extra requirement on the MAC algorithm. As opposed



Fig. 1. A schematic of the three generic approaches; (a) E&A, (b) EtA, and (c) AtE.

to the EtA compositions, the tag in the E&A and AtE compositions is a function of the plaintext message (not the ciphertext as in EtA). Therefore, the tag must be at least as confidential as the ciphertext since, otherwise, the secrecy of the plaintext can be compromised by an adversary observing its corresponding tag.

One class of MACs that is of a particular interest, due its fast implementation, is the class of MACs based on universal hash-function families. In universal hash-function families based MACs, the message to be authenticated is first compressed using a universal hash function in the Carter-Wegman style [15] and, then, the compressed image is processed with a cryptographic function. Indeed, processing messages using universal hash functions is faster than processing them block by block using block ciphers. Combined with the fact that processing short strings is faster than processing longer ones, it becomes evident why universal hash functions based MACs are the fastest for message authentication. (The speed champions of MACs in the literature of cryptography are UMAC [16] and hash127 [17]; both of which are based on universal hash functions [18].)

Recently, however, Handschuh and Preneel [19] discovered a vulnerability in universal hash functions based MACs. They demonstrated that once a collision in the universal hash function is achieved, subsequent forgeries can succeed with higher probabilities. Their attack is not directed to a specific universal hash family and can be applied to all such MACs. The recommendation of the work in [19] is not to reuse the universal hash function keys, thus going back to the earliest use of universal hash families for unconditionally secure authentication, or proceeding with the less efficient, yet more secure, block cipher based MACs.

CONTRIBUTIONS. In this paper, we propose the deployment of a new cryptographic primitive for the construction of secure channels using the E&A and AtE compositions. We introduce the design of $\mathcal{E}$-MACs: *Authentication Codes for Encrypted Messages*. By proposing the first instance of $\mathcal{E}$-MACs, we show how the structure of the E&A and AtE systems can be utilized to increase the efficiency and security of the authentication process. In particular, we show how a universal hash function based $\mathcal{E}$-MAC can be computed with fewer operations than what standard universal hash functions based MACs require. That is, we will demonstrate that universal hash functions based $\mathcal{E}$-MACs can be implemented without the need to apply any cryptographic operation to the compressed image. Moreover, we will also demonstrate that $\mathcal{E}$-MACs can further utilize the special structures of the E&A and AtE systems to improve the security of the authentication process. That is, we will show how universal hash functions based $\mathcal{E}$-MACs can be secured against the key-recovery attack, to which standard universal hash functions based MACs are known to be vulnerable. Finally, we will show that the extra confidentiality requirement on $\mathcal{E}$-MACs can be achieved rather easily, again, by taking advantage of the E&A and AtE structures.

ORGANIZATION. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss related work. In Section 3, we list the used notations and security definitions. In Section 4 we describe the security model that will be used to analyze the proposed schemes. An instance of $\mathcal{E}$-MACs is proposed in Section 5. The performance discussion and advantage of $\mathcal{E}$-MACs are addressed in Section 6. The security analysis of the proposed $\mathcal{E}$-MAC and the security of the generic compositions constructed using the proposed $\mathcal{E}$-MAC are detailed in Section 7. Section 8 is dedicated to the discussion of the key-recovery vulnerability of universal hash functions based MACs and the description of how $\mathcal{E}$-MACs can utilize the structures of the E&A and AtE systems to overcome this vulnerability. The paper is concluded in Section 9.

2 Related Work

Many standard MACs that can be used in the construction of authenticated encryption schemes have appeared in the literature. Standard MACs can be block ciphers based, cryptographic hash functions based, or universal hash functions based.

CBC-MAC is one of the most known block cipher based MACs specified in FIPS publication 113 [21] and the International Organization for Standardization ISO/IEC 9797-1 [22]. CMAC, a modified version of CBC-MAC, is presented in the NIST special publication 800-38B [23], which was based on OMAC of Iwata and Kurosawa[24]. Other block cipher based MACs include, but are not limited to, XOR-MAC [25] and PMAC [26]. The security of different block cipher-based MACs has been exhaustively studied (see, e.g., [27]).

The use of one-way cryptographic hash functions for message authentication was introduced by Tsudik in [28]. HMAC is a popular example of the use of iterated cryptographic hash functions in the design of MACs [29], which was adopted as a standard [30]. Another

cryptographic hash function based MAC is the MDx-MAC of Preneel and Oorschot [31]. HMAC and two variants of MDx-MAC are specified in the International Organization for Standardization ISO/IEC 9797-2 [32]. Bosselaers et al. described how cryptographic hash functions can be carefully coded to take advantage of the structure of the Pentium processor to speed up the authentication process [33]. Similar to the case of block cipher based MACs, the security of cryptographic hash function based MACs has been extensively studied (see, e.g., [34]).

The use of universal hash families was first introduced by Carter and Wegman in the context of designing unconditionally secure authentication [15]. The use of universal hash functions for the design of computationally secure MACs appeared in [16], [17], [35]–[40]. The basic concept behind the design of computationally secure universal hash functions based MACs is to compress the message using universal hash functions and then process the compressed output using a cryptographic function. The key idea is that processing messages using universal hash functions is faster than processing them block by block using block ciphers. Then, since the hashed image is typically much shorter than the message itself, processing the hashed image with a cryptographic function is faster then processing the entire message.

Standard MACs have also been used alongside encryption algorithms to generically construct secure channels. The network layer of SSH [8], the IPsec [10], and the SSL [9] (followed by the TLS [11]) use variants of E&A, EtA, and AtE compositions, respectively. Kohno et al. [12] proposed the high-performance Carter-Wegman Counter (CWC) mode of encrypt-then-authenticate, which the NIST standard Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) was based on [41].

Unlike the proposed $\mathcal{E}$-MACs, the previous classes of MACs, even the ones used alongside encryption algorithms, are designed independently of any other operation that might be performed on the plaintext. Consequently, if the plaintext is also to be encrypted, such MACs are not designed to utilize any advantage the coupled encryption algorithm can provide.

The security relations among different notions of security in authenticated encryption schemes was studied in detail by Bellare and Namprempre in [14]. Canetti and Krawczyk showed that EtA schemes build secure channels [42]. Krawczyk analyzed the security of the three generic constructions methods in [13]. Bellare et al. showed that SSH is provably secure in [43]. Maurer and Tackmann showed that the AtE can result in secure channels in [44]. Such studies, however, focus on the security aspects of different generic constructions, while this work focus on the performance aspects of different constructions.

As opposed to generic constructions of authenticated encryption systems, block ciphers that combine encryption and message authentication have been proposed in the literature. Variety of earlier schemes based on adding some redundancy to messages before cipher block chaining (CBC) encryption were found vulnerable to attacks [14]. Proposals that use simple check-sum or manipulation detection code (MDC) have appeared in [45]–[47]. Such simple schemes, however, are known to be vulnerable to attacks [3]. Other dedicated schemes that combine encryption and message authenticity include [2]–[7].

Gligor and Donescu proposed the XECB-MAC [2]. The XECB-MAC possesses all the operational properties of the XOR-MAC [25] with about only half the block cipher calls of the standard XOR-MAC. In [3], Jutla proposed the integrity aware parallelizable mode (IAPM), an encryption scheme with authentication. The authenticated encryption requires a total of $m + 2$ block cipher evaluation for a message of m blocks. Rogaway et al. [4] proposed OCB: a block-cipher mode of operation for efficient authenticated encryption. For a message of length M-bits and an n-bit cipher block size, their method requires $\lceil \frac{M}{n} \rceil + 2$ block cipher runs. In [7], Alomair proposed an improvement on the CWC scheme of [12]. He showed that by advancing the hashing phase to be applied on the plaintext, before block cipher encryption, the requirements on the hash function can be relaxed, leading to faster implementations, without affecting the security of the scheme.

The difference between a dedicated authenticated encryption primitive and the proposed $\mathcal{E}$-MACs is that the former is designed to work as a standalone system, while the latter are special purpose MACs that can utilize the existence of a coupled encryption algorithm to construct efficient generic authenticated encryption systems.

3 Notations and Preliminaries

3.1 Notations

The following notations will be used throughout the rest of the paper. For any non-empty set I, the cardinality of the set is denoted as $|I|$. For any two strings a and b, $(a||b)$ denotes any operation that allows the reconstruction of a and b from $(a||b)$. When the lengths of a and b are known, the concatenation operation is an example of such operations. Throughout the rest of the paper, random variables will be represented by bold font symbols, whereas the corresponding non-bold font symbols represent specific values that can be taken by these random variables.

3.2 Universal Hash-Function Families

A family of hash functions $\mathcal{H}$ is specified by a finite set of keys $\mathcal{K}$. Each key $k \in \mathcal{K}$ defines a member of the family $\mathcal{H}_k \in \mathcal{H}$. As opposed to thinking of $\mathcal{H}$ as a set of functions from A to B, it can be viewed as a single function $\mathcal{H} : \mathcal{K} \times A \rightarrow B$, whose first argument is usually written as a subscript. A random element $h \in \mathcal{H}$ is determined by selecting a $k \in \mathcal{K}$ uniformly at random and setting $h = \mathcal{H}_k$.

There has been a number of different definitions of universal hash families; we give below a formal definition of one class of universal hash families called ϵ-almost universal hash families.

Definition 1 (ϵ-AU Hash Families): Let $\mathcal{H} = \{h : A \to B\}$ be a family of hash functions and let $\epsilon \geq 0$ be a real number. We say that $\mathcal{H}$ is ϵ-almost universal, denoted ϵ-AU, if for all distinct $M, M' \in A$, we have that $\Pr_{h \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}[h(M) = h(M')] \leq \epsilon$. We say that $\mathcal{H}$ is ϵ-almost universal on equal-length strings if for all distinct, equal-length strings $M, M' \in A$, we have that $\Pr_{h \leftarrow \mathcal{H}}[h(M) = h(M')] \leq \epsilon$.

4 Security Model

4.1 Authenticity

A message authentication scheme consists of a signing algorithm $\mathcal{S}$ and a verifying algorithm $\mathcal{V}$. The signing algorithm might be probabilistic, while the verifying one is usually not. Associated with the scheme are parameters ℓ and N describing the length of the shared key and the resulting authentication tag, respectively. On input an ℓ-bit key K and a message M, algorithm $\mathcal{S}$ outputs an N-bit string τ called the authentication tag, or the MAC of m.[1] On input an ℓ-bit key K, a message M, and an N-bit tag τ, algorithm $\mathcal{V}$ outputs a bit, with 1 standing for accept and 0 for reject. We ask for a basic validity condition, namely that authentic tags are accepted with probability one. That is, if $\tau = \mathcal{S}(K, M)$, it must be the case that $\mathcal{V}(K, M, \tau) = 1$ for any key K, message M, and tag τ.

In general, an adversary in a message authentication scheme is a probabilistic algorithm $\mathcal{A}$, which is given oracle access to the signing and verifying algorithms $\mathcal{S}(K, \cdot)$ and $\mathcal{V}(K, \cdot, \cdot)$ for a random but hidden choice of K. $\mathcal{A}$ can query $\mathcal{S}$ to generate a tag for a plaintext of its choice and ask the verifier $\mathcal{V}$ to verify that τ is a valid tag for the plaintext. Formally, the following is a standard game to model existential unforgeability under chosen message attacks (EU-CMA):

Game 1 (EU-CMA game):

1) A random string of length ℓ is selected as the shared secret.
2) Suppose $\mathcal{A}$ makes a signing query on a message M. Then the oracle computes an authentication tag $\tau = \mathcal{S}(K, M)$ and returns it to $\mathcal{A}$. (Since $\mathcal{S}$ may be probabilistic, this step requires making the necessary underlying choice of a random string for $\mathcal{S}$, anew for each signing query.)
3) Suppose $\mathcal{A}$ makes a verify query (M, τ). The oracle computes the decision $d = \mathcal{V}(K, M, \tau)$ and returns it to $\mathcal{A}$.

The adversary can query the signing oracle for q times before attempting the forgery attempt. We model the authenticity of the scheme by its existential unforgeability under chosen message attacks and define

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\text{auth}}_{\text{MAC}}(\mathcal{A}) = \Pr[\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{S}(\cdot,\cdot)} \text{ existentially forges}] \quad (1)$$

to be $\mathcal{A}$'s advantage in breaking the authenticity of the MAC algorithm when given oracle access to the signing algorithm $\mathcal{S}$. Then, the MAC algorithm is said to be unforgeable if $\mathsf{Adv}^{\text{auth}}_{\text{MAC}}(\mathcal{A})$ is negligible.

As in [14], we say that the MAC algorithm is weakly unforgeable against chosen-message attacks (WUF-CMA) if $\mathcal{A}$ cannot make a verify query (M, τ) which is accepted for an M that has not been queried to the signing oracle $\mathcal{S}$. We say that the MAC algorithm is strongly unforgeable against chosen-message attacks (SUF-CMA) if $\mathcal{A}$ cannot make a verify query (M, τ) which is accepted regardless of whether or not M is *new*, as long as the tag has not been attached to the message by the signing oracle.

4.2 Privacy

Let $\mathcal{A}$ be an adversary who is given oracle access to the encryption algorithm, $\mathcal{E}$, and can ask the oracle to encrypt a polynomial number of messages to get their corresponding ciphertexts. The encryption algorithm is said to be IND-CPA secure if the adversary, after calling the signed encryption oracle a polynomial number of times, is given a ciphertext corresponding to one of two plaintext messages of her choice cannot determine the plaintext corresponding to the given ciphertext with an advantage significantly higher than $1/2$. Formally, the following is a standard game to model IND-CPA security of encryption algorithms.

Game 2 (IND-CPA game):

1) The challenger draws a key $K \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}$ uniformly at random.
2) $\mathcal{A}$ calls the signed encryption oracle a polynomial number of times on messages of its choice and records the corresponding ciphertexts.
3) $\mathcal{A}$ gives the signed encryption oracle two messages, m_0 and m_1, of equal length.
4) The challenger draws a bit $b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$ uniformly at random, encrypts m_b, and returns the resulting ciphertext to $\mathcal{A}$.
5) $\mathcal{A}$ can then call the signed encryption oracle a polynomial number of times and eventually outputs a bit, b'.
6) $\mathcal{A}$ wins the game if $b' = b$.

Let

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\text{ind-cpa}}_{\mathcal{E}}(\mathcal{A}) = \Big| \Pr[b' = b] - 1/2 \Big| \quad (2)$$

represent $\mathcal{A}$'s advantage of breaking the IND-CPA security of the encryption algorithm $\mathcal{E}$. Then, $\mathcal{E}$ is said to be IND-CPA secure if $\mathsf{Adv}^{\text{ind-cpa}}_{\mathcal{E}}$ is negligible.

5 The Proposed $\mathcal{E}$-MAC

In this section, we describe an instance of $\mathcal{E}$-MACs and use it to construct two generic authenticated encryp-

1. Depending on the specific implementation, messages usually need to be pre-processed, e.g., padded and divided into blocks.

tion compositions: one is based on the Encrypt-and-Authenticate (E&A) composition and the other is based on the Authenticate-then-Encrypt (AtE) composition.

5.1 Overview of the Proposed $\mathcal{E}$-MAC

The basic goal of any encryption scheme is secrecy; that is, given the ciphertext, it must be hard for an adversary without the knowledge of the decryption key to recover the plaintext. Since the main objective of this work is to introduce the general idea of utilizing the encryption operation for more efficient designs of MACs, rather than targeting a specific application, the proposed $\mathcal{E}$-MAC is designed to work with any secure encryption scheme. Thus, the only assumption that we make on the underlying encryption scheme is the IND-CPA security described in Section 4.2.

Just like fast MACs, the proposed $\mathcal{E}$-MAC utilizes universal hash families in the Carter-Wegman style [48], [49]. However, as opposed to universal hash functions based MACs, we will show that $\mathcal{E}$-MACs can be secure without any post computation performed on the compressed image. (Recall that universal hash functions based MACs have two rounds of computations: 1. message compression using universal hash functions and, 2. output transformation, which in most practical applications a pseudorandom function applied to the compressed image [16], [19].) That is, as will be shown in the remaining of this section, the structure of the authenticated encryption system can be utilized to eliminate the need to employ pseudorandom function families. Thus, improving the speed of the MAC and reducing the required amount of shared key information (the key needed to identify the pseudorandom function).

Before we proceed with the detailed description of the proposed $\mathcal{E}$-MAC, we emphasize that the proposed universal hash family used for the implementation of the proposed $\mathcal{E}$-MAC is not the only possible solution. As mentioned earlier, the goal of this paper is not to come up with any specific design but rather the general idea of utilizing of the structure of the authenticated encryption composition to improve the security and efficiency of message authentication. In fact, any ϵ-almost-Δ-universal (ϵ-AΔU) hash family, such as the multi-modular hash (MMH) family of Halevi and Krawczyk [36] or the new hash (NH) family of Black et al. [16], will satisfy the security requirements detailed in Section 7, as can be seen in the proof of Theorem 3 and the remark following it. (The ϵ-AΔU is a stronger notion than ϵ-AU given in Definition 1; interested readers may refer to [36] for a formal definition of ϵ-AΔU hash families.)

Furthermore, different assumptions about the underlying encryption algorithm may lead to different constructions of $\mathcal{E}$-MACs. We only show here how the IND-CPA security of the underlying encryption algorithm can be utilized to improve the efficiency and security of message authentication. Whether the assumption that the encryption algorithm is also a pseudorandom permutation or a strong pseudorandom permutation can be utilized for further improvements in $\mathcal{E}$-MACs performance is left for a continuing research in this direction.

The only operations required to implement the proposed $\mathcal{E}$-MAC are modular addition and multiplication (i.e., operations over the integer ring $\mathbb{Z}_n$, for a finite integer n). For the proposed universal hash family to be secure against message modification, and to ensure a 2^{1-N}-AU hashing, where N is the length of the authentication tag, the multiplication needs to satisfy two properties.

Property 1: For any two integers α and β in $\mathbb{Z}_n$, if n divides $\alpha\beta$, then one of the integers α and β must be the zero element. Formally, the following one-way implication must hold:

$$\{\alpha\beta \equiv 0 \mod n\} \Rightarrow \{\alpha \equiv 0 \ \vee \ \beta \equiv 0 \mod n\}. \quad (3)$$

Property 1 is satisfied by any $\mathbb{Z}_n$ that is also an integral domain [50].

Property 2: Given an integer $k \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$, for an r uniformly distributed over $\mathbb{Z}_n$, the value $\delta \equiv rk \mod n$ is uniformly distributed over $\mathbb{Z}_n$.

Property 2 is satisfied by any $\mathbb{Z}_n$ that is also a field (it is a direct consequence of the fact that every nonzero element in a field is invertible). Since every field is an integral domain, and every integer ring $\mathbb{Z}_p$, where p is prime integer is a field, multiplication modulo p satisfies both properties. Thus, the operations used for the rest of the paper are performed over the integer field $\mathbb{Z}_p$.

5.2 Encrypt-and-Authenticate Composition

5.2.1 Instantiation

Assume legitimate users agreed on using an encryption algorithm, $\mathcal{E}$, that provides indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA). Based on a security parameter, N, choose p to be the largest prime integer less than 2^N (for instance, $p = 2^{32} - 5$ for $N = 32$). Define $K := (k_1, k_2, \ldots, k_B)$, for k_i's drawn uniformly and independently from the multiplicative group $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$, to be the shared secret key that will be used for message authentication. As in typical universal hash functions, depending on the values of N and B, the key might be long. One way to generate such a key is via a pseudorandom generator, e.g., [51], [52]. In such a case, only the seed of the pseudorandom generator is required to be distributed to the legitimate parties. Note further that this key generation operation is performed only once during the instantiation phase. That is, once the key is generated, it can be used to authenticate an arbitrary number of messages. Thus, the key generation does not affect the complexity of the overall system.

As in symmetric-key cryptographic systems, the shared secret is distributed to the legitimate users via a secure channel. With the knowledge of the shared secret, legitimate users can exchange subsequent messages,



Fig. 2. A block diagram illustrating the use of $\mathcal{E}$-MAC to construct an E&A composition.

over insecure channels, in an authenticated and confidential way. Observe, however, that the encryption key, $K_{\mathcal{E}}$, in our setup is independent of the authentication key, K. Only the shared keys are assumed to be secret; all other parameters such as N, B, and p are publicly known.

5.2.2 Authentication

Define MaxLen $:= N(B-1)-1$ to be the upper bound on the length of plaintext messages (in bits) to be authenticated. Append the bit '1' to the end of the message, M, and divide M into blocks of length N-bits; that is, $M = m_1||m_2||\dots||m_L$, where $L = \lceil |M|/N \rceil \leq B-1$ and $|m_i| = N$ for all i's except possibly m_L. (We overload m_i to denote both the binary string in the i^{th} block and the unsigned integer representation of the i^{th} block as an element of $\mathbb{Z}_p$ in a big-endian format; the distinction between the two representations will be omitted when it is clear from the context.)

Remark 1: We emphasize that each message block, m_i, is considered an element of $\mathbb{Z}_p$ not $\mathbb{Z}_{2^N}$. That is, if two distinct N-bit integers are congruent modulo p, they are considered the same message block. Note, however, that this does not have a noticeable impact on the the performance of the system since only a negligible portion of N-bit integers will be congruent modulo the largest N-bit prime. For instance, if $N = 32$, only five 32-bit integers are congruent module $2^{32} - 5$.

Now, for every message M to be encrypted and authenticated, the sender generates an integer r drawn uniformly at random from $\mathbb{Z}_p$ (this r represents the coin tosses of $\mathcal{S}$). We emphasize that r must be independent of all r's generated to authenticate other messages. The sender encrypts (M, r) and transmits the resulting ciphertext $c = \mathcal{E}(M, r)$ to the intended receiver (recall that the encryption key is independent of the $\mathcal{E}$-MAC key). The N-bit long tag of message M is computed as:

$$\tau = \sum_{i=1}^{L} k_i m_i + k_B r \mod p, \tag{4}$$

where m_i denotes the i^{th} block of message M.

A block diagram depicting the use of the proposed $\mathcal{E}$-MAC for the construction of an Encrypt-and-Authenticate generic composition is shown in Figure 2.

Remark 2: Appending a '1' at the end of the message is important to guarantee security for variable-length messages. Without the '1' at the end of the message, the authentication is only secure for equal-length messages. To see that, consider messages $M = m_1||0$ and $M' = m_1||00$, where M has only a single zero bit in its last block and M' has two zeros. Then, M and M' will have the same authentication tag, provided the coin tosses, r, used in both authentication is the same. Now, assume a stream cipher is used for encryption. Then, an adversary can call the oracle on $M' = m_1||00$ and obtain the outputted ciphertext and tag. The adversary can use the same tag to authenticate the message $M = m_1||0$ since the second message block does not contribute to the authentication tag. Attaching a '1' at the end of the last message bit will make $M = m_1||01$ and $M' = m_1||001$ and, hence, the scheme can be used to authenticate messages of different lengths (since changing the message length will change the authentication tag in an unpredictable way depending on the key corresponding to the last message block).

A pseudocode describing the signing algorithm of the proposed E&A composition is shown in Algorithm 1.

Algorithm 1 $\mathcal{S}(K, M, r)$

```
if |M| > MaxLen then
  Return 0
end if
Write K as a sequence of blocks k_1 || ... || k_B;
Set M = M||1;
Write M as a sequence of blocks m_1 || ... || m_L;
τ = Σ_{i=1}^{L} k_i m_i + k_B r  mod p;
Return τ
```

Remark 3: As will be formally proven in Section 7, the bound on the probability of successful forgery is dependent on the security parameter, N. Depending on application, one might require lower bounds on probability of successful forgery. A straightforward way is to increase the security parameter to give lower probability of successful forgery. This approach is not desired, especially for software implementations as it results in performance degradation. Another method is to hash the same message multiple times with independent keys. This, however, will require a much longer key. A well-studied and more efficient method is to use the Toeplitz-extension on the hash function [53], [54] (see, e.g., [16] for a detailed use of Toeplitz-extension to increase the security of MACs based on universal hash functions). We omit describing this topic since it is out of the scope of this work and refer interested readers to [16], [36], [53], [54] for more details.

5.2.3 Verification

Upon receiving a ciphertext c, the receiver calls the corresponding decryption algorithm $\mathcal{D}$ to extract the plaintext $M||r$. To verify the integrity of $M||r$, the receiver computes $\sum_{i=1}^{L} k_i m_i + k_B r$ and authenticates the message



Fig. 3. A block diagram illustrating the use of $\mathcal{E}$-MAC to construct an AtE composition.

only if the computed value is congruent to the received τ modulo p. Formally, the following integrity check must be satisfied for the message to be authenticated:

$$\tau \stackrel{?}{\equiv} \sum_{i=1}^{L} k_i m_i + k_B r \mod p. \tag{5}$$

Remark 4: We emphasize that the random nonce r requires no key management. It is generated by the sender as the coin tosses of the signing algorithm and delivered to the receiver via the ciphertext. In other words, it is not a shared secret and it requires no synchronization.

A pseudocode describing the verifying algorithm of the proposed Encrypt-and-Authenticate composition is shown in Algorithm 2.

Algorithm 2 $\mathcal{V}(K, M, r, \tau)$

```
Write K as a sequence of blocks k_1 || ... || k_B;
Write M as a sequence of blocks m_1 || ... || m_L;
τ' = Σ_{i=1}^{L} k_i m_i + k_B r  mod p;
if τ' = τ then
  Return 1
else
  Return 0
end if
```

5.3 Authenticate-then-Encrypt Composition

5.3.1 Instantiation

As in the E&A of the Section 5.2, assume legitimate users agreed on using an encryption algorithm, $\mathcal{E}$, that provides indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA). Based on a security parameter N, legitimate users choose p to be the largest N-bit long prime integer. Define $K := (k_1, k_2, \ldots, k_B)$, for k_i's drawn uniformly and independently from $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$, to be the shared secret key that will be used for message authentication.

5.3.2 Authentication

Define MaxLen $:= NB - 1$ to be the upper bound on the length of plaintext messages (in bits) to be authenticated. Append the bit '1' to the end of the message, M, and divide M into blocks of length N-bits; that is, $M = m_1||m_2||\ldots||m_L$, where $L = \lceil |M|/N \rceil \leq B$ and $|m_i| = N$ for all i's except possibly m_L. Compute the N-bit compressed image of M as

$$\sigma = \sum_{i=1}^{L} k_i m_i \mod p, \tag{6}$$

where m_i denotes the i^{th} block of the plaintext message, M. A block diagram depicting the use of the proposed $\mathcal{E}$-MAC to construct an Authenticate-then-Encrypt composition is shown in Figure 3.

The sender encrypts (M, σ) and transmits the resulting ciphertext to the intended receiver. The ciphertext can be the encryption of the concatenation of the plaintext message and its compressed image (i.e., $c = \mathcal{E}(M, \sigma)$) or it can be the concatenation of the encryption of the plaintext and the encryption of the compressed image (i.e., $c = \mathcal{E}(M), \tau = \mathcal{E}(\sigma)$). In either scenario, the security of the system is the same and, for the rest of the paper, we will assume the latter scenario ($c = \mathcal{E}(M)$ will denote the ciphertext and $\tau = \mathcal{E}(\sigma)$ will denote the authentication tag). A pseudocode describing the signing algorithm of the proposed AtE composition is shown in Algorithm 3.

Algorithm 3 $\mathcal{S}(K, M)$

```
if |M| > MaxLen then
  Return 0
end if
Write K as a sequence of blocks k_1 || ... || k_B;
Set M = M||1;
Write M as a sequence of blocks m_1 || ... || m_L;
τ = E( Σ_{i=1}^{L} k_i m_i  mod p );
Return τ
```

5.3.3 Verification

Upon receiving the ciphertext, the receiver calls the corresponding decryption algorithm $\mathcal{D}$ to extract the plaintext message, M. To verify the integrity of M, the receiver computes its N-bit long compressed image $\sum_{i=1}^{L} k_i m_i \mod p$, encrypts the resulting compressed image, and authenticates the message only if the encryption of the compressed image is equal to the received authentication tag, τ. Formally, the following integrity check must be satisfied for the message to be authenticated:

$$\tau \stackrel{?}{\equiv} \mathcal{E}\Big(\sum_{i=1}^{L} k_i m_i \mod p\Big). \tag{7}$$

A pseudocode describing the verifying algorithm of the proposed Authenticate-then-Encrypt composition is shown in Algorithm 4.

6 Performance of $\mathcal{E}$-MACs

There are three main classes of MACs that can be used in the generic compositions of secure channels: MACs based on block ciphers, MACs based on cryptographic hash functions, and MACs based on universal hash functions. As discussed earlier, however, universal hashing is the fastest method to construct MACs [18]; hence, we restrict the performance discussion to universal hashing based MACs used to construct secure channels.

Algorithm 4 $\mathcal{V}(K, M, \tau)$

Write K as a sequence of blocks $k_1 \parallel \cdots \parallel k_B$;
Write M as a sequence of blocks $m_1 \parallel \cdots \parallel m_L$;
$\tau' = \mathcal{E}\Big(\sum_{i=1}^{L} k_i m_i \mod p\Big)$;
if $\tau' = \tau$ **then**
  Return 1
else
  Return 0
end if

Recall that universal hash function based MACs consist of two sequential operations: a *universal hashing* followed by a *cryptographic operation*. Observe further that universal hashing is much faster than cryptographic primitives. For instance, while universal hash functions can run in about 0.34 cycles/byte [16], the cryptographic hash functions SHA-256 and SHA-512 run in about 23.73 cycles/byte and 40.18 cycles/byte, respectively [55]. That is, universal hashing computations are typically orders of magnitude faster than cryptographic computations. Therefore, it is evident how eliminating the need to post-process the compressed image with a cryptographic function will have an impact on the computational efficiency of the overall construction.

To give a concrete performance comparison of the entire authenticated encryption composition with existing ones, consider the Carter-Wegman Counter (CWC) mode of authenticated encryption of Kohno et al. [12]. (The CWC was later standardized by NIST in its Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) of authenticated encryption [41]). In CWC, the message is first encrypted using the counter mode of encryption, then the ciphertext is authenticated using a MAC based on a universal hash function. Since the CWC adopts the EtA composition, the authentication involves first hashing the ciphertext using a universal hash function and then encrypting the resulting hashed image. Assuming that the counter mode of encryption is used in our construction, the encryption part of the CWC is the same as the proposed composition. What we show in this paper is that, by advancing the hash phase before encrypting the plaintext, encrypting the hashed image of the ciphertext in CWC can be eliminated without affecting the security of the construction.

Note further that proposed $\mathcal{E}$-MACs, being generic, can be used alongside stream ciphers, one of the major performance advantages of generic compositions over dedicated ones [13] (since stream ciphers are known to be much faster than their block cipher counterparts [56]).

There is yet another important efficiency aspect of the proposed $\mathcal{E}$-MACs. Namely, the encryption and transmission of the coin tosses, r. However, for any encryption algorithm to be IND-CPA secure, it must probabilistic [56], [57]. Therefore, any IND-CPA encryption will involve some randomness. Revisiting our previous example of the CWC scheme, note that it requires the encryption and transmission of an 88-bit nonce to provide IND-CPA security. That is, the coin tosses, r, in the proposed $\mathcal{E}$-MACs serves the same purpose the nonce serves in CWC. Therefore, the coin tosses in our proposed scheme does not impose extra computation nor does it impose extra transmission overhead.

7 Security Analysis

7.1 General Lemmas

The following lemmas are the main ingredient for the security of the proposed $\mathcal{E}$-MAC.

Lemma 1: Let m_i and k_i be the i^{th} message block and i^{th} key, respectively. For a modified message block $m_i' \not\equiv m_i \mod p$, the probability that $k_i m_i' \equiv k_i m_i \mod p$ is zero.

Proof: Assume $m_i' \equiv m_i + \delta \mod p$ for some $\delta \in \mathbb{Z}_p$. Then,

$$k_i m_i' - k_i m_i = k_i(m_i' - m_i) = k_i\delta \stackrel{?}{\equiv} 0 \mod p. \quad (8)$$

Trivially, the value $\delta \equiv 0 \mod p$ satisfies the condition in equation (8). However, $\delta \equiv 0 \mod p$ implies that the received block is identical to the transmitted one.

For all other values of δ, the condition in equation (8) can never be satisfied. This is a direct consequence of Property 1, which states that for the multiplication of any two integers in $\mathbb{Z}_p$ to be congruent to *zero* modulo p, one of them *must* be zero. By design, however, the key k_i is not the zero element. Therefore, for any nonzero $\delta \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, $k_i\delta \not\equiv 0 \mod p$ and consequently, $k_i m_i' \not\equiv k_i m_i \mod p$ for all $m_i' \not\equiv m_i \mod p$. □

Lemma 2: Let k_1 and k_2 be two secret keys in the proposed $\mathcal{E}$-MAC. The probability to choose two nonzero integers δ_1 and δ_2 in $\mathbb{Z}_p$ such that $k_1\delta_1 \equiv k_2\delta_2 \mod p$ is at most $1/(p-1)$.

Proof: Fix a $\delta_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$. By Property 2, the resulting $(k_1\delta_1 \mod p)$ will be uniformly distributed over $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$. Similarly, the resulting $(k_2\delta_2 \mod p)$ is uniformly distributed over $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$. Since k_1 and k_2 are assumed to be secret, the probability that $k_1\delta_1 \equiv k_2\delta_2 \mod p$ is $1/(p-1)$. □

7.2 Security of Encryption

In this section, we show that the privacy of the proposed compositions is provably secure assuming the underlying encryption algorithm provides indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA). Let Σ be an authenticated encryption scheme. Define $\mathsf{Adv}_{\Sigma}^{\text{priv}}(\mathcal{A})$ to be adversary's $\mathcal{A}$ advantage of breaking the privacy of Σ, where the privacy of Σ is modeled as its IND-CPA security.

Theorem 1: Let $\mathcal{E}$-MAC$_{\text{E\&A}}$ be the authenticated encryption of Section 5.2 with $\mathcal{E}$ as the underlying encryption. Then given an adversary, $\mathcal{A}$, against the privacy of $\mathcal{E}$-MAC$_{\text{E\&A}}$, one can construct an adversary $\mathcal{B}$ against $\mathcal{E}$ such that

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\text{priv}}_{\mathcal{E}\text{-MAC}_{\text{E\&A}}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq \mathsf{Adv}^{\text{ind-cpa}}_{\mathcal{E}}(\mathcal{B}), \quad (9)$$

where $\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{ind-cpa}}(\mathcal{B})$ is as defined in equation (2).

Theorem 1 states that if the adversary can expose private information from the proposed E&A composition of Section 5.2, she can also break the security of the underlying encryption algorithm. That is, if $\mathcal{E}$ provides IND-CPA, then the proposed authenticated encryption composition provides data privacy. Before we proceed with the proof of Theorem 1, we need the following lemma.

Lemma 3: In the E&A composition described in Section 5.2, authentication tags are statistically independent of their corresponding messages, and different authentication tags are mutually independent.

Proof: Let the secret key $K = k_1||k_2||\cdots||k_B$ be fixed. Let the plaintext message, M, consist of L blocks, where $L \leq B-1$. Then for any tag $\tau \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ computed according to equation (4) and any plaintext message M the following holds:

$$\Pr(\boldsymbol{\tau} = \tau | \boldsymbol{M} = M) = \Pr\left(\boldsymbol{r} = (\tau - \sum_{i=1}^{L} k_i m_i)\ k_B^{-1}\right) \quad (10)$$

$$= \frac{1}{p}, \quad (11)$$

where m_i denotes the i^{th} block of the message M. Equation (11) holds by the assumption that r is drawn uniformly from $\mathbb{Z}_p$. The existence of k_B^{-1}, the multiplicative inverse of k_B in the integer field $\mathbb{Z}_p$, is a direct consequence of the fact that k_B is not the zero element.

Furthermore, by Property 2, for an r drawn uniformly at random from $\mathbb{Z}_p$, the resulting $(k_B r \mod p)$ is uniformly distributed over $\mathbb{Z}_p$. Consequently, for any plaintext message M, since the tag is a result of adding $(k_B r \mod p)$ to $(\sum_i k_i m_i \mod p)$, and since $(k_B r \mod p)$ is uniformly distributed over $\mathbb{Z}_p$, the resulting tag is uniformly distributed over $\mathbb{Z}_p$. That is, for any fixed value $\tau \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, the probability that the tag will take this specific value is given by:

$$\Pr(\boldsymbol{\tau} = \tau) = \frac{1}{p}. \quad (12)$$

Combining Bayes' theorem [58] with equations (11) and (12) yields:

$$\Pr(\boldsymbol{M} = M | \boldsymbol{\tau} = \tau) = \frac{\Pr(\boldsymbol{\tau} = \tau | \boldsymbol{M} = M) \Pr(\boldsymbol{M} = M)}{\Pr(\boldsymbol{\tau} = \tau)}$$

$$= \Pr(\boldsymbol{M} = M). \quad (13)$$

Equation (13) implies that the tag τ gives no information about the plaintext M since τ is statistically independent of M. Similarly, one can show that the tag is independent of the secret key.

Now, let τ_1 through τ_ℓ represent the tags for messages M_1 through M_ℓ, respectively. Let $L_i \leq B-1$ be the number of blocks of message M_i, for $i = 1, \cdots, \ell$. Further, let r_1 through r_ℓ be the coin tosses of the signing algorithm $\mathcal{S}$ for the authentication of messages M_1 through M_ℓ, respectively. Recall that r_i's are *mutually independent* and *uniformly* distributed over $\mathbb{Z}_p$. Then, for any possible values of the messages M_1 through M_ℓ with arbitrary joint probability mass function, and all possible values of τ_1 through τ_ℓ, we get:

$$\Pr(\boldsymbol{\tau}_1 = \tau_1, \cdots, \boldsymbol{\tau}_\ell = \tau_\ell)$$

$$= \sum_{M_1,\cdots,M_\ell} \Pr\Big(\boldsymbol{\tau}_1 = \tau_1, \cdots, \boldsymbol{\tau}_\ell = \tau_\ell | \boldsymbol{M_1} = M_1, \cdots, \boldsymbol{M_\ell} = M_\ell\Big) \cdot \Pr\Big(\boldsymbol{M_1} = M_1, \cdots, \boldsymbol{M_\ell} = M_\ell\Big) \quad (14)$$

$$= \sum_{M_1,\cdots,M_\ell} \Pr\Big(\boldsymbol{r}_1 = (\tau_1 - \sum_{i=1}^{L_1} k_i m_{1_i})\ k_B^{-1}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{r}_\ell = (\tau_\ell - \sum_{i=1}^{L_\ell} k_i m_{\ell_i})\ k_B^{-1}\Big) \cdot \Pr\Big(\boldsymbol{M_1} = M_1, \cdots, \boldsymbol{M_\ell} = M_\ell\Big) \quad (15)$$

$$= \sum_{M_1,\cdots,M_\ell} \Pr\Big(\boldsymbol{r}_1 = (\tau_1 - \sum_{i=1}^{L_1} k_i m_{1_i})\ k_B^{-1}\Big) \cdots \Pr\Big(\boldsymbol{r}_\ell = (\tau_\ell - \sum_{i=1}^{L_\ell} k_i m_{\ell_i})\ k_B^{-1}\Big) \cdot \Pr\Big(\boldsymbol{M_1} = M_1, \cdots, \boldsymbol{M_\ell} = M_\ell\Big) \quad (16)$$

$$= \sum_{M_1,\cdots,M_\ell} \Big(\frac{1}{p}\Big)^{\ell} \cdot \Pr\Big(\boldsymbol{M_1} = M_1, \cdots, \boldsymbol{M_\ell} = M_\ell\Big) \quad (17)$$

$$= \Pr(\boldsymbol{\tau}_1 = \tau_1) \cdots \Pr(\boldsymbol{\tau}_\ell = \tau_\ell), \quad (18)$$

where m_{j_i} denotes the i^{th} block of the j^{th} message M_j. Equation (16) holds due to the independence of the $\boldsymbol{r}_i$'s; equation (17) holds due to the uniform distribution of the $\boldsymbol{r}_i$'s; and equation (18) holds due to the uniform distribution of the $\boldsymbol{\tau}_i$'s. Therefore, authentication tags are mutually independent, and the lemma follows. □

We can now proceed with the proof of Theorem 1.

Proof of Theorem 1: There are two functions of the plaintext that are transmitted to the intended receiver: the ciphertext and the authentication tag. By Lemma 3, each authentication tag is statistically independent of its corresponding message and the $\mathcal{E}$-MAC key. Therefore, no information about the encrypted message nor the $\mathcal{E}$-MAC key can be exposed by the observation of their corresponding tag. Furthermore, also by Lemma 3, different authentication tags are mutually independent. Therefore, no advantage can be gained by the observation of multiple authentication tags. Consequently, unless private information is exposed by the observed ciphertexts, no information about the encrypted messages or the $\mathcal{E}$-MAC key will be exposed by the observed authentication tags.

Now, let $\mathcal{A}$ be an adversary against the privacy of the E&A composition and let $\mathcal{B}$ be an adversary with oracle access to the encryption algorithm $\mathcal{E}$. Adversary $\mathcal{A}$ runs adversary $\mathcal{B}$ to attack the privacy of observed ciphertexts. Then, $\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}\text{-MAC}_{\text{E\&A}}}^{\text{priv}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq \mathsf{Adv}_{\mathcal{E}}^{\text{ind-cpa}}(\mathcal{B})$ as desired. □

Theorem 2: Let $\mathcal{E}$-MAC$_{\text{AtE}}$ be the authenticated encryption of Section 5.3 using $\mathcal{E}$ as the underlying encryption.

Then given an adversary, $\mathcal{A}$, against the privacy of $\mathcal{E}$-MAC$_{\text{AtE}}$, one can construct an adversary $\mathcal{B}$ against $\mathcal{E}$ such that

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\text{priv}}_{\mathcal{E}\text{-MAC}_{\text{AtE}}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq \mathsf{Adv}^{\text{ind-cpa}}_{\mathcal{E}}(\mathcal{B}), \tag{19}$$

where $\mathsf{Adv}^{\text{ind-cpa}}_{\mathcal{E}}(\mathcal{B})$ is as defined in equation (2).

The proof of Theorem 2 is similar to the proof of Theorem 1 and, thus, is omitted. The only difference here is that the privacy of the authentication tag is not obtained from the coin tosses, the r's, but rather by encrypting the compressed image with the underlying encryption algorithm.

We will now state the main theorems regarding the probability of successful forgery against the proposed constructions.

7.3 Security of Authentication

Let $\mathsf{Adv}^{\text{auth}}_{\mathcal{E}\text{-MAC}}(\mathcal{A})$ to be adversary's $\mathcal{A}$ advantage of successful forgery against the generic compositions described in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 as defined in equation (1). We give here information-theoretic bounds on the adversary's probability of successful forgery assuming the use of an information-theoretically secure encryption (the complexity-theoretic analog is discussed after the theorem statement).

Theorem 3: Let $\mathcal{A}$ be an adversary making a q signing queries before attempting a forgery on the proposed $\mathcal{E}$-MAC. Provided the information-theoretic security of the underlying encryption scheme, the probability that $\mathcal{A}$ is successful is at most

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\text{auth}}_{\mathcal{E}\text{-MAC}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq \begin{cases} \dfrac{1}{p} & \text{if } \; q = 0 \\ \dfrac{1}{p-1} & \text{if } \; q > 0. \end{cases} \tag{20}$$

It is standard to pass to a complexity-theoretic analog of Theorem 3. One gets the following. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be an adversary with oracle access to the generic compositions of Sections 5.2 and 5.3. Then, there is an adversary $\mathcal{B}$ attacking the privacy of the underlying encryption algorithm in which

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\text{auth}}_{\mathcal{E}\text{-MAC}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq \mathsf{Adv}^{\text{ind-cpa}}_{\mathcal{E}}(\mathcal{B}) + \frac{1}{p-1}.$$

Therefore, given IND-CPA secure encryption, $\mathsf{Adv}^{\text{ind-cpa}}_{\mathcal{E}}(\mathcal{B})$ is negligible and, hence, so does $\mathsf{Adv}^{\text{auth}}_{\mathcal{E}\text{-MAC}}(\mathcal{A})$.

Proof of Theorem 3: By Lemma 3, the tag is uniformly distributed over $\mathbb{Z}_p$. Hence, if the adversary makes no signing queries, the probability of forging a valid tag is $1/p$.

Assume that the adversary has queried the signing oracle $\mathcal{S}(K, \cdot)$ for q times and recorded the sequence $(M_1, \tau_1), \cdots, (M_q, \tau_q)$.

Now, consider calling the query $\mathcal{V}(K, M', \tau')$, where M' and τ' are any message-tag pair of the adversary's choice. We aim to bound the probability of successful forgery for an M' that has not been queried to the signing oracle; that is, $M' \neq M_i$ for any $i = 1, \cdots, q$. We break the proof into two cases: queried tag and unqueried tag. (In the case of the E&A composition of Section 5.2, r_i will be denoted as the B^{th} block of the i^{th} message, that is, $r = m_{i_B}$.)

QUERIED TAG $(M', \tau' = \tau_i)$: Assume that $\tau' = \tau_i$ for an $i \in \{1, \cdots, q\}$. This case represents the event that a collision in the hashing operation occurs. Then, $\mathcal{V}(k, M', \tau') = 1$ if and only if the following holds:

$$\sum_{\ell=1}^{B} k_\ell \; m'_\ell \stackrel{?}{\equiv} \tau' \equiv \tau_i \equiv \sum_{\ell=1}^{B} k_\ell \; m_\ell \mod p, \tag{21}$$

where m'_ℓ denotes the ℓ^{th} block of M' and m_ℓ denotes the ℓ^{th} block of M_i (note that we write m_ℓ instead of m_{i_ℓ} for ease of notation since no distinction between different messages is necessary). We will analyze equation (21) by considering the following three cases: M' and M_i differ by a single block, M' and M_i differ by two blocks, or M' and M_i differ by more than two blocks.

1) Assume that only a single message block is different. Since addition is commutative, assume without loss of generality that the first message block is different; that is, $m'_1 \not\equiv m_1 \mod p$. Since only the first message block is different, equation (21) is equivalent to

$$k_1 m'_1 \equiv k_1 m_1 \mod p. \tag{22}$$

Therefore, by Lemma 1, the probability of successful forgery given a single block difference is *zero*.

2) Assume, without loss of generality, that the first two message blocks are different; i.e., $m'_1 \equiv m_1 + \delta_1 \not\equiv m_1 \mod p$ and $m'_2 \equiv m_2 + \delta_2 \not\equiv m_2 \mod p$. Then, equation (21) is equivalent to

$$k_1\delta_1 + k_2\delta_2 \equiv 0 \mod p. \tag{23}$$

Therefore, by Lemma 2, the probability of successful forgery given that exactly two message blocks are different is at most $1/(p-1)$.

3) Assume that more than two message blocks are different, i.e., $m'_j \equiv m_j + \delta_j \not\equiv m_j \mod p$; $\forall \; j \in J \subseteq \{1, 2, \cdots, B\}; |J| \geq 3$. Then, equation (21) is equivalent to

$$k_j\delta_j + \sum_{\substack{\ell \in J \\ \ell \neq j}} k_\ell \delta_\ell \equiv 0 \mod p, \tag{24}$$

for some $j \in J$. Therefore, using Lemma 2 and the fact that $\sum_{\ell \in J, \ell \neq j} k_\ell \delta_\ell$ can be congruent to *zero* modulo p, the probability of success is at most $1/p$. (The difference between this case and the case of exactly two blocks is that, even if the δ's are chosen to be nonzero integers, $\sum_{\ell \in J, \ell \neq j} k_\ell \delta_\ell$ can still be congruent to zero modulo p.)

From the above three cases, the probability of successful forgery when the forged tag has been queried to the

signing oracle is at most $1/(p-1)$.

UNQUERIED TAG (M', τ'): Assume now that the tag τ' is different than all the recorded tags; that is, $\tau' \neq \tau_i$ for any $i = 1, \cdots, q$. If τ' is independent of the recorded tags, then the probability of successful forgery is $1/p$ (using the fact that the tag is uniformly distributed over $\mathbb{Z}_p$). Assume, however, that τ' is a function of τ_i, for an $i \in \{1, \cdots, q\}$. Let $\tau' \equiv \tau_i + \gamma \mod p$ for some $\gamma \in \mathbb{Z}_p \backslash \{0\}$ of the adversary's choice. (Note that, γ can be a function of any value recorded by the adversary.) Then, $\mathcal{V}(K, M', \tau') = 1$ if and only if the following congruence holds:

$$\sum_{\ell=1}^{B} k_\ell \; m'_\ell \stackrel{?}{\equiv} \tau' \equiv \tau_i + \gamma \equiv \sum_{\ell=1}^{B} k_\ell \; m_\ell + \gamma \mod p, \quad (25)$$

where m'_ℓ denotes the ℓ^{th} block of M' and m_ℓ denotes the ℓ^{th} block of M_i. Bellow we analyze equation (25) by considering two cases: M' and M_i differ by a single block, or M' and M_i differ by more than one block.

1) Without loss of generality, assume that M' and M_i differ in the first block only. That is $m'_1 \equiv m_1 + \delta \not\equiv m_1 \mod p$ and $m'_j \equiv m_j \mod p$ for all $j = 2, \cdots, B$. Then, equation (25) is equivalent to

$$k_1 \delta \equiv \gamma \mod p. \quad (26)$$

Therefore, by Lemma 2, the probability of success is at most $1/(p-1)$.

2) Assume now that M' and M_i differ by more than one block. That is, $m'_j \equiv m_j + \delta_j \neq m_j \mod p$; $\forall j \in J \subseteq \{1, 2, \cdots, B\}; |J| \geq 2$. Then, equation (25) is equivalent to

$$\sum_{j \in J} k_j \delta_j \equiv \gamma \mod p. \quad (27)$$

By Lemma 2 and the fact that $\sum_{j \in J} k_j \delta_j$ can be congruent to *zero* modulo p, the probability of success is at most $1/p$.

From the above two cases, the probability of successful forgery when the forged tag has not been queried is at most $1/(p-1)$.

Therefore, given that $\mathcal{A}$ has made at least one signing query, $\mathcal{A}$'s probability of successful forgery for each verify query is at most $1/(p-1)$. □

Remark 5: The proof of Theorem 3 gives a tighter bound on the used universal hash family. Specifically, the case of queried tag implies that the used hash family is $(\frac{1}{p-1})$-AU. Similarly, the case of unqueried tag implies that the used hash family is $(\frac{1}{p-1})$-AΔU.[2] The proof also illustrates why any ϵ-AΔU hash family can be used to construct the proposed $\mathcal{E}$-MAC. That is, any ϵ-AΔU hash family will have a probability of successful forgery given an unqueried tag less than ϵ.

2. The ϵ-AΔU is a stronger notion than ϵ-AU given in Definition 1; interested readers may refer to [36] for a formal definition of ϵ-AΔU hash families.

We now show that the proposed $\mathcal{E}$-MACs are strongly unforgeable under chosen message attacks (SUF-CMA). Recall that SUF-CMA requires that it be computationally infeasible for the adversary to find a new message-tag pair after chosen-message attacks even if the message is not new, as long as the tag has not been attached to the message by a legitimate user [14].

Theorem 4: The E&A generic composition using the $\mathcal{E}$-MAC described in Section 5.2 is strongly unforgeable under chosen message attacks.

Proof: Let (M, τ) be a valid message tag pair. Assume that the adversary is attempting to authenticate the same message with a different tag τ'. Since the plaintext message is the same but the tag is different, the r corresponding to τ must be different than the r' corresponding to τ'. For the (M, τ') pair to be authenticated, $\sum_i k_i m_i + k_B r' \mod p$ must be equal to τ'. That is, given τ', r' must be set to $k_B^{-1}(\tau' - \sum_i k_i m_i) \mod p$ for the tag to be authenticated. By Theorems 1, however, the adversary cannot expose the $\mathcal{E}$-MAC's key. Therefore, Theorem 3 holds whether or not the message is new, as long as the tag has not been attached to the message by the signing oracle. □

The AtE composition of Section 5.3 requires more discussion. If the encryption algorithm is deterministic, then the same message cannot be authenticated with two distinct tags. However, the use of deterministic encryption algorithm violates the assumption that the underlying encryption provides indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attacks (an encryption algorithm with IND-CPA must be probabilistic [56], [59]). Although most practical secure encryption algorithms that can be used to construct the AtE of Section 5.3 will result in a strongly unforgeable authentication, one can come up with an algorithm that satisfies IND-CPA but does not result in a strongly unforgeable authentication when used to compose the AtE system of Section 5.3. To guarantee strong unforgeability for all constructions, the last message block can be replaced by a random string, in which case the proof of strong unforgeability will be the same as the proof of Theorem 4.

7.4 Security of the Generic Compositions

In [14], Bellare and Namprempre defined two notions of integrity in authenticated encryption schemes, integrity of plaintexts (INT-PTXT) and integrity of ciphertexts (INT-CTXT). INT-PTXT implies that it is computationally infeasible for an adversary to produce a ciphertext decrypting to a message which the sender had never encrypted, while INT-CTXT implies that it is computationally infeasible for an adversary to produce a ciphertext not previously produced by the sender, regardless of whether or not the corresponding plaintext is *new*. By combining an encryption algorithm that provides indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-CPA) and a MAC algorithm that is unforgeable under chosen-message attack, the work in [14] analyzes the security of the three generic compositions.

In [14], Bellare and Namprempre showed that the E&A and AtE generic compositions are generally insecure, the results do not apply to all variants of E&A and AtE constructions. For instance, as per [14], E&A compositions do not generally provide IND-CPA because there exist secure MACs that reveal information about the plaintext (the authors of [14] provide a detailed example). Obviously, if such a MAC is used in the construction of an E&A system, the resulting composition will not provide IND-CPA. Unlike standard MACs, however, it is a basic requirement of $\mathcal{E}$-MACs to be as secret as the used encryption algorithm. Indeed, Theorem 1 guarantees that the proposed E&A composition does not reveal any information about the plaintext that is not revealed by the ciphertext.

Another result of [14] is that generic E&A and AtE compositions do not provide INT-CTXT. (Although the authors acknowledged that the notion of INT-PTXT is the more natural security requirement while the interest of the stronger INT-CTXT notion is more in the security implications derived in [14].) The reason why E&A and AtE compositions generally do not provide INT-CTXT is that one can come up with a secure encryption algorithm with the property that a ciphertext can be modified without changing its decryption [14]. Obviously, when such an encryption algorithm is combined with the proposed $\mathcal{E}$-MACs to construct an E&A or AtE system, since the tag is computed as a function of the plaintext, only INT-PTXT is reached.

In practice, however, it is possible to construct E&A and AtE systems that do provide INT-CTXT. For instance, a sufficient condition for the proposed $\mathcal{E}$-MAC to provide INT-CTXT for the composed system is to be used with a secure *one-to-one* encryption algorithm. To see this observe that any modification of the ciphertext will correspond to modifying the plaintext (since the encryption is one-to-one). Therefore, by Theorem 3, modified ciphertexts can only be accepted with negligible probabilities. Indeed, secure E&A and AtE systems have been constructed in practice. Popular examples of such constructions are SSH [8], SSL [9] and TLS [11], which use variants of the E&A and AtE compositions that are known to be secure [13], [43], [44], [60].

So far, we have shown that $\mathcal{E}$-MACs can be used to replace standard MACs in the construction of E&A and AtE systems with two additional properties: they can have provable confidentiality and they can be more efficient. What we will show next is that $\mathcal{E}$-MACs can have another security advantage. More specifically, we will show that $\mathcal{E}$-MACs can utilize the structure of the E&A system to achieve better resilience to a new attack on universal hash functions based MACs; namely, the key-recovery attack [19].

8 $\mathcal{E}$-MACs and Key Recovery

Recently, Handschuh and Preneel [19] showed that, compared to block cipher based, MACs based on universal hash functions have a key-recovery vulnerability. In principle, a small probability of successful forgery on authentication codes is always possible. However, the work in [19] demonstrates that, for universal hash functions based MACs, once a successful forgery is achieved, subsequent forgeries can succeed with high probabilities. The main idea in their attacks is to look for a collision in the message compression phase. Once a message that causes a collision is found, partial information about the hashing keys can be exposed. Using this key information an attacker can forge valid tags for fake messages. We give a detailed example below.

Example 1: Consider the universal hash family presented in this paper. Assume an adversary calling the signing oracle on $M = m_1||m_2$, thus obtaining its authentication tag τ. The adversary now can call the verification oracle with $M = m_2||m_1$ and the same tag τ. Obviously, the verification will pass if and only if $k_1 \equiv k_2 \mod p$ (in which case $k_1 m_1 + k_2 m_2 \equiv k_2 m_1 + k_1 m_2 \mod p$).

Although the verification will pass with a small probability, the adversary can continuously call the verification oracle with $M = m_2||\alpha_i m_1$, for different α_i's until the message is authenticated. Let $M = m_2||\alpha m_1$ be the message that passes the verification test, for some $\alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$. Then, the relation

$$k_1 \equiv \beta k_2 \mod p, \tag{28}$$

where $\beta = (\alpha m_1 - m_2)(m_1 - m_2)^{-1}$ is exposed to the adversary. With this knowledge, a man in the middle can always replace the first two blocks, $m_1||m_2$, of any future message M with $\beta^{-1}m_2||\beta m_1$ without violating its tag. This is because $k_1(\beta^{-1}m_2) + k_2(\beta m_1) \equiv k_2 m_2 + k_1 m_1 \mod p$ regardless of values of m_1 and m_2.

Handschuh and Preneel [19] defined three classes of weak keys in universal hash functions. Each class can be exploited in a way similar to the one discussed in the above example to substantially increase the probability of successful forgery after a single collision. This attack is shared by all universal hash based MACs [19]. As per [19], the recommended mitigations to this attack are to use the less efficient block cipher based MACs, or not to reuse the same hashing key for multiple authentication.

Compared to standard MACs, however, $\mathcal{E}$-MACs can utilize the structure of the E&A and AtE systems to overcome the key-recovery problem discovered in [19]. Consider the $\mathcal{E}$-MAC proposed in Section 5, and recall that a random number $r \in_R \mathbb{Z}_p$ is generated internally in the E&A process. In the basic construction of Section 5, the goal of r is to encrypt the authentication tag. However, the random r can play a pivotal role in key-recovery security.

In the basic construction in Section 5, the universal hashing key is $K = k_1||k_2||\cdots||k_B$ and the authentication tag is computed as:

$$\tau = \sum_{i=1}^{L} k_i m_i + k_B r \mod p. \tag{29}$$

Now, with the same shared key, consider another use of r. More specifically, let the authentication tag be computed as follows:

$$\tau = \sum_{i=1}^{L} (k_i \oplus r) m_i + k_B r \mod p. \quad (30)$$

In other words, r can be used to randomize the key in every authentication call.

Assume the same attack described in Example 1 and let $M = m_2 || \alpha m_1$ passes the verification test, for some $\alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$. This time, however,

$$k_1' \equiv \beta k_2' \mod p, \quad (31)$$

where $k_1' = k_1 \oplus r$, $k_2' = k_2 \oplus r$, and $\beta = (\alpha m_1 - m_2)(m_1 - m_2)^{-1}$ is the relation revealed to the adversary. For any future authentication, the sender will generate a new random number r' that is independent of r. Thus, the keys that will be used for authentication will be k_1'' and k_2'', where $k_i'' = k_i \oplus r'$ for $i = 1, 2$. That is, from the standpoint of key-recovery attacks, by using equation (30) instead of equation (29), different authentication tags are computed with different keys. Therefore, finding a collision in the message compression phase does not lead to information leakage about the keys, as long as the same nonce does not authenticate different messages. (Note that there is no need to randomize k_B since it is independent of the message to be authenticated.)

Remark 6: This shows how the system can be designed to utilize the authenticated encryption application to increase the robustness of universal hash functions based $\mathcal{E}$-MACs. This could not have been achieved without the use of the fresh random number r that was secretly delivered to the verifier as part of the ciphertext.

9 Conclusion and Future Work

In this work, we studied the generic composition of authenticated encryption systems. We introduced $\mathcal{E}$-MACs, a new symmetric-key cryptographic primitive that can be used in the construction of E&A and AtE compositions. By taking advantage of the E&A and AtE structures, the use of $\mathcal{E}$-MACs is shown to improve the efficiency and security of the authentication operation. More precisely, since the message to be authenticated is encrypted, universal hash functions based $\mathcal{E}$-MACs can designed without the need to apply cryptographic operations on the compressed image, since this can be replaced by operations performed by the encryption algorithm. Further, by appending a random string at the end of the plaintext message, $\mathcal{E}$-MAC can be secured against key-recovery attacks.

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